UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
Washington, D.C. 20549

 

Form 10-Q

 

 

 

 

Commission File No.: 0-50231

 

 

Federal National Mortgage Association

(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)

 

 

Fannie Mae

 

 

 

 

Registrant’s telephone number, including area code:

(202) 752-7000

 

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant (1) has filed all reports required to be filed by Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to file such reports), and (2) has been subject to such filing requirements for the past 90 days.  Yes þ     No o

 

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant has submitted electronically and posted on its corporate Web site, if any, every Interactive Data File required to be submitted and posted pursuant to Rule 405 of Regulation S-T (§ 232.405 of this chapter) during the preceding 12 months (or for such shorter period that the registrant was required to submit and post such files).  Yes þ     No o

 

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a large accelerated filer, an accelerated filer, a non-accelerated filer, or a smaller reporting company. See the definitions of “large accelerated filer,” “accelerated filer” and “smaller reporting company” in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act. (Check one):

 

(Do not check if a smaller reporting company)

 

Indicate by check mark whether the registrant is a shell company (as defined in Rule 12b-2 of the Exchange Act).  Yes o     No þ

 

As of March 31, 2011, there were 1,119,602,427 shares of common stock of the registrant outstanding.

 

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

 

MD&A TABLE REFERENCE

 

 

 

We have been under conservatorship, with the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) acting as conservator, since September 6, 2008. As conservator, FHFA succeeded to all rights, titles, powers and privileges of the company, and of any shareholder, officer or director of the company with respect to the company and its assets. The conservator has since delegated specified authorities to our Board of Directors and has delegated to management the authority to conduct our day-to-day operations. Our directors do not have any duties to any person or entity except to the conservator and, accordingly, are not obligated to consider the interests of the company, the holders of our equity or debt securities or the holders of Fannie Mae MBS unless specifically directed to do so by the conservator. We describe the rights and powers of the conservator, key provisions of our agreements with the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”), and their impact on shareholders in our Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2010 (“2010 Form 10-K”) in “Business—Conservatorship and Treasury Agreements.”

 

You should read this Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations (“MD&A”) in conjunction with our unaudited condensed consolidated financial statements and related notes and the more detailed information in our 2010 Form 10-K.

 

This report contains forward-looking statements that are based on management’s current expectations and are subject to significant uncertainties and changes in circumstances. Please review “Forward-Looking Statements” for more information on the forward-looking statements in this report. Our actual results may differ materially from those reflected in these forward-looking statements due to a variety of factors including, but not limited to, those described in “Risk Factors” and elsewhere in this report and in “Risk Factors” in our 2010 Form 10-K.

 

You can find a “Glossary of Terms Used in This Report” in the “MD&A” of our 2010 Form 10-K.

 

Fannie Mae is a government-sponsored enterprise (“GSE”) that was chartered by Congress in 1938 to support liquidity, stability and affordability in the secondary mortgage market, where existing mortgage-related assets are purchased and sold. Our charter does not permit us to originate loans or lend money directly to consumers in the primary mortgage market. Our most significant activities are securitizing mortgage loans originated by lenders into Fannie Mae mortgage-backed securities, which we refer to as Fannie Mae MBS, and purchasing mortgage loans and mortgage-related securities for our mortgage portfolio. We use the term “acquire” in this report to refer both to our securitization activity and our purchase activity.

 

We obtain funds to purchase mortgage-related assets for our mortgage portfolio by issuing a variety of debt securities in the domestic and international capital markets. We also make other investments that increase the supply of affordable housing.

 

We are a corporation chartered by the U.S. Congress. Our conservator is a U.S. government agency. Treasury owns our senior preferred stock and a warrant to purchase 79.9% of our common stock, and Treasury has made a commitment under a senior preferred stock purchase agreement to provide us with funds under specified conditions to maintain a positive net worth. The U.S. government does not guarantee our securities or other obligations.

 

Our common stock was delisted from the New York Stock Exchange and the Chicago Stock Exchange on July 8, 2010 and since then has been traded in the over-the-counter market and quoted on the OTC Bulletin Board under the symbol “FNMA.” Our debt securities are actively traded in the over-the-counter market.

 

Summary of Our Financial Performance for the First Quarter of 2011

 

Our financial results for the first quarter of 2011 reflect continued weakness in the housing and mortgage markets, which remain under pressure from high levels of unemployment, underemployment and the prolonged decline in home prices.

 

Comprehensive loss.  Our total comprehensive loss for the first quarter of 2011 was $6.3 billion, consisting of a net loss of $6.5 billion and other comprehensive income of $181 million. In comparison, we recognized a total comprehensive loss of $435 million in the fourth quarter of 2010, consisting of net income of $65 million and other comprehensive loss of $500 million, and a total comprehensive loss of $10.2 billion in the first quarter of 2010, consisting of a net loss of $11.5 billion and other comprehensive income of $1.4 billion.

 

The change from net income in the fourth quarter of 2010 to net loss in the first quarter of 2011 was primarily due to a $6.7 billion increase in credit-related expenses. Credit-related expenses consist of the provision for loan losses, the provision for guaranty losses and foreclosed property expense. Our higher provision for loan losses during the period was primarily driven by an increase in our total loss reserves due to: (1) a decline in home prices and increase in initial charge-off severity during the period, (2) the number of loans that entered a trial modification period during the quarter, (3) a decline in future expected home prices and (4) loans continuing to remain delinquent for an extended period of time. In addition, the fourth quarter of 2010 reflects a $1.2 billion reduction to credit-related expenses resulting from the resolution of outstanding repurchase requests with Bank of America, N.A. and its affiliates.

 

The $5.1 billion decrease in our net loss in the first quarter of 2011 compared with the first quarter of 2010 was due primarily to a $2.2 billion increase in net interest income, driven by lower interest expense on debt; $289 million in net fair value gains in the first quarter of 2011 compared with $1.7 billion in net fair value losses in the first quarter of 2010, primarily due to fair value gains on derivatives and trading securities; and an $842 million decrease in credit-related expenses, due to a decrease in our provision for loan losses. Other comprehensive income in the first quarter of 2010 was primarily driven by a reduction in our unrealized loss due to significantly improved fair value of available-for-sale securities.

 

Net worth.  Our net worth deficit of $8.4 billion as of March 31, 2011 reflects the recognition of our total comprehensive loss of $6.3 billion and our payment to Treasury of $2.2 billion in senior preferred stock dividends during the first quarter of 2011. In May 2011, the Acting Director of FHFA submitted a request to Treasury on our behalf for $8.5 billion to eliminate our net worth deficit.

 

In the first quarter of 2011, we received $2.6 billion in funds from Treasury to eliminate our net worth deficit as of December 31, 2010. Upon receipt of the additional funds requested to eliminate our net worth deficit as of March 31, 2011, the aggregate liquidation preference on the senior preferred stock will be $99.7 billion, which will require an annualized dividend payment of $10.0 billion. This amount exceeds our reported annual net income for each year since our inception. Through March 31, 2011, we have paid an aggregate of $12.4 billion to Treasury in dividends on the senior preferred stock.

 

Total loss reserves.  Our total loss reserves, which reflect our estimate of the probable losses we have incurred in our guaranty book of business, increased to $72.1 billion as of March 31, 2011 from $66.3 billion as of December 31, 2010. Our total loss reserve coverage to total nonperforming loans was 34.66% as of March 31, 2011, compared with 30.85% as of December 31, 2010. The continued stress on a broad segment of borrowers from persistent high levels of unemployment and underemployment and the prolonged decline in home prices have caused our total loss reserves to remain high for the past several quarters. Further, the shift in our nonperforming loan balance from loans in our collective reserve to loans that are individually impaired has caused our coverage ratio to increase.

Providing Liquidity, Our Strong New Book of Business and Expected Losses on Single-Family Loans We Acquired before 2009 (Our “Legacy” Book of Business)

 

In the first quarter of 2011, we continued our work to provide liquidity to the mortgage market, grow the strong new book of business we have acquired since January 1, 2009, shortly after we entered into conservatorship, and minimize our losses from delinquent loans.

 

 

Factors that Could Cause Actual Results to be Materially Different from Our Estimates and Expectations

 

We present a number of estimates and expectations in this executive summary regarding the profitability of single-family loans we have acquired, our single-family credit losses and credit-related expenses, and our draws from and dividends to be paid to Treasury. These estimates and expectations are forward-looking statements based on our current assumptions regarding numerous factors, including future home prices and the future performance of our loans. Our future estimates of these amounts, as well as the actual amounts, may differ materially from our current estimates and expectations as a result of home price changes, changes in interest rates, unemployment, direct and indirect consequences resulting from failures by servicers to follow proper procedures in the administration of foreclosure cases, government policy, changes in generally accepted accounting principles (“GAAP”), credit availability, social behaviors, other macro-economic variables, the volume of loans we modify, the effectiveness of our loss mitigation strategies, management of our real-estate owned (“REO”) inventory and pursuit of contractual remedies, changes in the fair value of our assets and liabilities, impairments of our assets, or many other factors, including those discussed in “Risk Factors,” “Forward-Looking Statements” and elsewhere in this report and in “Risk Factors” in our 2010 Form 10-K. For example, if the economy were to enter a deep recession, we would expect actual outcomes to differ substantially from our current expectations.

 

Providing Mortgage Market Liquidity

 

We support liquidity and stability in the secondary mortgage market, serving as a stable source of funds for purchases of homes and multifamily rental housing and for refinancing existing mortgages. We provide this financing through the activities of our three complementary businesses: our Single-Family business (“Single-Family”), our Multifamily Mortgage business (“Multifamily”) and our Capital Markets group. Our Single-

Family and Multifamily businesses work with our lender customers, who deliver mortgage loans that we purchase and securitize into Fannie Mae MBS. Our Capital Markets group manages our investment activity in mortgage-related assets, funding investments primarily through proceeds we receive from the issuance of debt securities in the domestic and international capital markets. The Capital Markets group also works with lender customers to provide funds to the mortgage market through short-term financing and other activities, making short-term use of our balance sheet. These financing activities include whole loan conduit transactions, early funding transactions, Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (“REMIC”) and other structured securitization activities, and dollar rolls, which we describe in more detail in our 2010 Form 10-K in “Business—Business Segments—Capital Markets Group.”

 

In the first quarter of 2011, we purchased or guaranteed approximately $189 billion in loans, measured by unpaid principal balance, which includes approximately $20 billion in delinquent loans we purchased from our single-family MBS trusts. Excluding delinquent loans purchased from our MBS trusts, our purchases and guarantees enabled our lender customers to finance approximately 759,000 single-family conventional loans and multifamily loans secured by multifamily properties with approximately 83,000 units.

 

We remained the largest single issuer of mortgage-related securities in the secondary market, with an estimated market share of new single-family mortgage-related securities issuances of 48.6% during the first quarter of 2011. In comparison, our estimated market share of new single-family mortgage-related securities issuances was 49.0% in the fourth quarter of 2010 and 40.8% in the first quarter of 2010. If the Federal Housing Administration (“FHA”) continues to be the lower-cost option for some consumers, and in some cases the only option, for loans with higher loan-to-value (“LTV”) ratios, our market share could be adversely impacted if the market shifts away from refinance activity, which is likely to occur when interest rates rise. We remain a constant source of liquidity in the multifamily market. Currently, we own or guarantee approximately one-fifth of the outstanding debt on multifamily properties.

 

Building a Strong New Single-Family Book of Business

 

Our new single-family book of business has a strong overall credit profile and is performing well. In this section, we discuss our expectations for these loans and their performance to date.

 

Expected Profitability of Our Single-Family Acquisitions

 

While it is too early to know how loans in our new single-family book of business will ultimately perform, given their strong credit risk profile, low levels of payment delinquencies shortly after acquisition, and low serious delinquency rates, we expect that, over their lifetime, these loans will be profitable. Table 1 provides information about whether we expect loans we acquired in 1991 through the first quarter of 2011 to be profitable, and the percentage of our single-family guaranty book of business represented by these loans as of March 31, 2011. The expectations reflected in Table 1 are based on the credit risk profile of the loans we have acquired, which we discuss in more detail in “Table 3: Credit Profile of Single-Family Conventional Loans Acquired” and in “Table 34: Risk Characteristics of Single-Family Conventional Business Volume and Guaranty Book of Business.” These expectations are also based on numerous other assumptions, including our expectations regarding home price declines set forth below in “Outlook.” As shown in Table 1, we expect loans we have acquired in 2009, 2010 and the first quarter of 2011 to be profitable. If future macroeconomic conditions turn out to be significantly more adverse than our expectations, these loans could become unprofitable. For example, we believe that these loans would become unprofitable if home prices declined more than 15% from their March 2011 levels over the next five years based on our home price index, which would be an approximately 34% decline from their peak in the third quarter of 2006.

 

 

As Table 1 shows, the key years in which we acquired loans that we expect will be unprofitable are 2005 through 2008. The vast majority of our realized credit losses since the beginning of 2009 were attributable to these loans. Although loans we acquired in 2004 were originated under more conservative acquisition policies than loans we acquired from 2005 through 2008, our 2004 acquisitions were made during a time when home prices were rapidly increasing, and their performance has suffered from the subsequent decline in home prices, which continued in the first quarter of 2011. We currently expect these loans to perform close to break-even, but changes in home prices, other economic conditions or borrower behavior could change our expectation regarding whether these loans will be profitable.

 

Loans we have acquired since the beginning of 2009 comprised 45% of our single-family guaranty book of business as of March 31, 2011. Our 2005 to 2008 acquisitions are becoming a smaller percentage of our guaranty book of business, having decreased from 39% of our guaranty book of business as of December 31, 2010 to 36% as of March 31, 2011.

Serious Delinquency Rates by Year of Acquisition

 

In our experience, an early predictor of the ultimate performance of loans is the rate at which the loans become seriously delinquent within a short period of time after acquisition. Loans we acquired in 2009 and 2010 have experienced historically low levels of delinquencies shortly after their acquisition. Table 2 shows, for single-family loans we acquired in each year from 2001 to 2010, the percentage that were seriously delinquent (three or more months past due or in the foreclosure process) as of the end of the first quarter following the acquisition year. Loans we acquired in 2011 are not included in this table because they were originated so recently that they could not yet have become seriously delinquent. As Table 2 shows, the percentage of our 2009 acquisitions that were seriously delinquent as of the end of the first quarter following their acquisition year was more than seven times lower than the average comparable serious delinquency rate for loans acquired in 2005 through 2008. For loans originated in 2010, this percentage was more than nine times lower than the average comparable rate for loans acquired in 2005 through 2008. Table 2 also shows serious delinquency rates for each year’s acquisitions as of March 31, 2011. Except for the most recent acquisition years, whose serious delinquency rates are likely lower than they will be after the loans have aged, Table 2 shows that the current serious delinquency rate generally tracks the trend of the serious delinquency rate as of the end of the first quarter following the year of acquisition. Below the table we provide information about the economic environment in which the loans were acquired, specifically home price appreciation and unemployment levels.

 

 

 

 

Credit Profile of Our Single-Family Acquisitions

 

Single-family loans we purchased or guaranteed from 2005 through 2008 were acquired during a period when home prices were rising rapidly, peaked, and then started to decline sharply, and underwriting and eligibility standards were more relaxed than they are now. These loans were characterized, on average and as discussed below, by higher LTV ratios and lower FICO credit scores than loans we have acquired since January 1, 2009. In addition, many of these loans were Alt-A loans or had other higher-risk loan attributes such as interest-only

payment features. As a result of the sharp declines in home prices, 34% of the loans that we acquired from 2005 through 2008 had mark-to-market LTV ratios that were greater than 100% as of March 31, 2011, which means the principal balance of the borrower’s primary mortgage exceeded the current market value of the borrower’s home. This percentage is higher when second lien loans secured by the same properties that secure our loans are included. The sharp decline in home prices, the severe economic recession that began in December 2007 and continued through June 2009, and continuing high unemployment and underemployment have significantly and adversely impacted the performance of loans we acquired from 2005 through 2008. We are taking a number of actions to reduce our credit losses. We discuss these actions and our strategy in our 2010 Form 10-K in “Business—Executive Summary—Our Strategies and Actions to Reduce Credit Losses on Loans in our Single-Family Guaranty Book of Business” and in “MD&A—Risk Management—Credit Risk Management—Single-Family Mortgage Credit Risk Management.”

 

In 2009, we began to see the effect of actions we took, beginning in 2008, to significantly strengthen our underwriting and eligibility standards and change our pricing to promote sustainable homeownership and stability in the housing market. As a result of these changes and other market dynamics, we reduced our acquisitions of loans with higher-risk attributes. Compared with the loans we acquired in 2005 through 2008, the loans we have acquired since January 1, 2009 have had better overall credit risk profiles at the time we acquired them and their early performance has been strong. Our experience has been that loans with characteristics such as lower original LTV ratios (that is, more equity held by the borrowers in the underlying properties), higher FICO credit scores and more stable payments will perform better than loans with risk characteristics such as higher original LTV ratios, lower FICO credit scores, Alt-A underwriting and payments that may adjust over the term of the loan. Table 3 shows improvements in the credit risk profile of single-family loans we have acquired since January 1, 2009 compared to loans we acquired from 2005 through 2008.

 

 

 

 

Improvements in the credit risk profile of our acquisitions since the beginning of 2009 over acquisitions in prior years reflect changes that we made to our pricing and eligibility standards, as well as changes that mortgage insurers made to their eligibility standards. We discuss these changes in our 2010 Form 10-K in “Business—Executive Summary—Our Expectations Regarding Profitability, the Single-Family Loans We Acquired Beginning in 2009, and Credit Losses—Credit Profile of Our Single-Family Acquisitions.” In addition, FHA’s role as the lower-cost option for some consumers for loans with higher LTV ratios has also reduced our acquisitions of these types of loans. The credit risk profile of our acquisitions since the beginning of 2009 has been influenced further by its significant percentage of refinanced loans. Refinanced loans generally perform better than purchase money loans, as the borrower has demonstrated a desire to maintain homeownership. As we discuss in “Outlook” below, we expect fewer refinancings in 2011 than in 2010.

 

In 2010 and 2011 our acquisitions of refinanced loans included a significant number of loans under our Refi Plus^tm initiative. Under Refi Plus we acquire refinancings of performing Fannie Mae loans that have current LTV ratios up to 125% and, in some cases, lower FICO credit scores than we generally require. Refi Plus

loans reduce the borrowers’ monthly payments or are otherwise more sustainable than the borrowers’ old loans. Our acquisitions under Refi Plus include our acquisitions under the Home Affordable Refinance Program (“HARP”), which was established by the Administration to help borrowers who may be unable to refinance the mortgage loan on their primary residence due to a decline in home values. The LTV ratios at origination for our 2010 and 2011 acquisitions are higher than for our 2009 acquisitions, primarily due to our acquisition of Refi Plus loans. The percentage of loans with LTV ratios at origination greater than 90% has increased from 4% for 2009 acquisitions to 7% for 2010 acquisitions and 8% for acquisitions in the first quarter of 2011.

 

Despite the increases in LTV ratios at origination associated with Refi Plus, the overall credit profile of our 2010 and 2011 acquisitions remains significantly stronger than the credit profile of our 2005 through 2008 acquisitions. Whether the loans we acquire in the future exhibit an overall credit profile similar to our acquisitions since the beginning of 2009 will depend on a number of factors, including our future eligibility standards and those of mortgage insurers, the percentage of loan originations representing refinancings, our future objectives, government policy, and market and competitive conditions.

 

Expected Losses on Our Legacy Book of Business

 

The single-family credit losses we realized from January 1, 2009 through March 31, 2011, combined with the amounts we have reserved for single-family credit losses as of March 31, 2011, as described below, total approximately $120 billion. The vast majority of these losses are attributable to single-family loans we purchased or guaranteed from 2005 through 2008.

 

While loans we acquired in 2005 through 2008 will give rise to additional credit losses that we have not yet realized, we estimate that we have reserved for the substantial majority of the remaining losses on these loans. Even though we believe a substantial majority of the credit losses we have yet to realize on these loans has already been reflected in our results of operations as credit-related expenses, we expect that our credit-related expenses will be higher in 2011 than in 2010 as weakness in the housing and mortgage markets continues. We also expect that future defaults on our legacy book of business and the resulting charge-offs will occur over a period of years. In addition, given the large current and anticipated supply of single-family homes in the market, we anticipate that it will take years before our REO inventory is reduced to pre-2008 levels.

 

We show how we calculate our realized credit losses in “Table 13: Credit Loss Performance Metrics.” Our reserves for credit losses described in this discussion consist of (1) our allowance for loan losses, (2) our allowance for accrued interest receivable, (3) our allowance for preforeclosure property taxes and insurance receivables, and (4) our reserve for guaranty losses (collectively, our “total loss reserves”), plus the portion of fair value losses on loans purchased out of MBS trusts reflected in our condensed consolidated balance sheets that we estimate represents accelerated credit losses we expect to realize. For more information on our reserves for credit losses, please see “Table 10: Total Loss Reserves.”

 

The fair value losses that we consider part of our reserves are not included in our “total loss reserves.” The majority of the fair value losses were recorded prior to our adoption in 2010 of new accounting standards on the transfers of financial assets and the consolidation of variable interest entities. Prior to our adoption of the new standards, upon our acquisition of credit-impaired loans out of unconsolidated MBS trusts, we recorded fair value loss charge-offs against our reserve for guaranty losses to the extent that the acquisition cost of these loans exceeded their estimated fair value. We expect to realize a portion of these fair value losses as credit losses in the future (for loans that eventually involve charge-offs or foreclosure), yet these fair value losses have already reduced the mortgage loan balances reflected in our condensed consolidated balance sheets and have effectively been recognized in our condensed consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive loss through our provision for guaranty losses. We consider these fair value losses as an “effective reserve,” apart from our total loss reserves, to the extent that we expect to realize credit losses on the acquired loans in the future.

Credit Performance

 

Table 4 presents information for each of the last five quarters about the credit performance of mortgage loans in our single-family guaranty book of business and actions taken by our servicers with borrowers to resolve existing or potential delinquent loan payments. We refer to these actions as “workouts.” The workout information in Table 4 does not reflect repayment plans and forbearances that have been initiated but not completed, nor does it reflect trial modifications that have not become permanent.

 

 

 

 

We provide additional information on our credit-related expenses in “Consolidated Results of Operations—Credit-Related Expenses” and on the credit performance of mortgage loans in our single-family book of business and our loan workouts in “Risk Management—Credit Risk Management—Single-Family Mortgage Credit Risk Management.”

 

Housing and Mortgage Market and Economic Conditions

 

During the first quarter of 2011, the United States economic recovery continued at a very slow pace. The U.S. gross domestic product, or GDP, rose by 1.8% on an annualized basis during the quarter, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis advance estimate. The overall economy gained an estimated 478,000 jobs in the first quarter as a result of employment growth in the private sector. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, as of March 2011, over the past 12 months there has been an increase of 1.3 million non-farm jobs. The unemployment rate was 8.8% in March 2011, compared with 9.0% in January 2011, based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment will likely need to post sustained improvement for an extended period to have a positive impact on housing.

 

Housing activity remained weak during the first quarter of 2011. Although home sales during the quarter increased modestly from the fourth quarter’s levels, sales of foreclosed homes and short sales (“distressed sales”) represented an outsized portion of the market. Distressed sales accounted for 40% of existing home sales in March 2011, up from 35% in March 2010, according to the National Association of REALTORS^®. In the face of competition from distressed sales, sales of new homes remained very low.

 

The overall mortgage market serious delinquency rate has trended down since peaking in the fourth quarter of 2009 but has remained historically high, with an estimated four million loans seriously delinquent (90 days or more past due or in the foreclosure process) as of December 31, 2010, based on the Mortgage Bankers Association National Delinquency Survey. In March, the supply of single-family homes as measured by the inventory/sales ratio remained above long-term average levels. Properties that are vacant and held off the market, combined with the portion of properties backing seriously delinquent mortgages not currently listed for sale, represent a significant shadow inventory putting downward pressure on home prices.

 

We estimate that home prices on a national basis declined by 1.8% in the first quarter of 2011 and have declined by 22.5% from their peak in the third quarter of 2006. Our home price estimates are based on preliminary data and are subject to change as additional data become available. The decline in home prices has left many homeowners with “negative equity” in their mortgages, which means their principal mortgage balance exceeds the current market value of their home. According to CoreLogic, approximately 11 million, or 23%, of all residential properties with mortgages were in a negative equity position in the fourth quarter of 2010. This increases the risk that borrowers might walk away from their mortgage obligations, causing the loans to become delinquent and proceed to foreclosure.

During the first quarter of 2011, the multifamily sector continued to improve due to increased rental demand and improving job growth. Based on preliminary third-party data, we estimate that the national multifamily vacancy rate on average fell by 25 basis points during the first quarter of 2011 to 7.0%, after having held steady in the fourth quarter of 2010. In addition, it appears that asking rents increased in the first quarter of 2011 by an estimated 50 basis points on a national basis. As indicated by data from Axiometrics, Inc., multifamily concession rates, the rental discount rate as a percentage of asking rents, declined during the first quarter of the year to 4.64% as of February 2011, after having increased during the fourth quarter of 2010 to end the year at 5.07%. The increase in rental demand is also reflected in an estimated increase of 44,000 units in the number of occupied rental units during the first three months of 2011, according to preliminary data from REIS, Inc. National multifamily fundamentals, which generally include factors such as effective rents, vacancy rates, supply and demand, job growth, and demographic trends, continued to improve in the first quarter. However, certain local markets and properties continue to exhibit weak fundamentals.

 

Outlook

 

Overall Market Conditions.  We expect weakness in the housing and mortgage markets to continue in 2011. The high level of delinquent mortgage loans will result in the foreclosure of troubled loans, which is likely to add to the excess housing inventory. Home sales are unlikely to rise before the unemployment rate improves further. In addition, servicer foreclosure process deficiencies and their consequences have created uncertainty for potential home buyers, because foreclosed homes account for a substantial part of the existing home market. Thus, widespread concerns about foreclosure process deficiencies could suppress home sales in the near term and interfere with the housing recovery.

 

We expect that single-family default and severity rates, as well as the level of single-family foreclosures, will remain high in 2011. Despite signs of multifamily sector improvement at the national level, we expect multifamily charge-offs in 2011 to remain commensurate with 2010 levels as certain local markets and properties continue to exhibit weak fundamentals. Conditions may worsen if the unemployment rate increases on either a national or regional basis.

 

We expect the pace of our loan acquisitions for the remainder of 2011 will be significantly lower than in 2010 and the first quarter of 2011, primarily because we expect fewer refinancings as a result of increasing mortgage rates and, to a lesser extent, the high number of mortgages that have already refinanced to low rates in recent years. To the extent our acquisitions decline, we will receive fewer risk-based fees, which are charged at loan acquisition and recognized over time; as a result, our future revenues will be negatively impacted. We estimate that total originations in the U.S. single-family mortgage market in 2011 will decrease from 2010 levels by approximately one-third, from an estimated $1.5 trillion to an estimated $1.0 trillion, and that the amount of originations in the U.S. single-family mortgage market that are refinancings will decline from approximately $1.1 trillion to approximately $413 billion. Refinancings comprised approximately 82% of our single-family business volume in the first quarter of 2011, compared with 78% for all of 2010.

 

Home Price Declines.  We expect that home prices on a national basis will decline further, with greater declines in some geographic areas than others, before stabilizing in late 2011. We now expect that the peak-to-trough home price decline on a national basis will range between 22% and 29%, as compared with our expectation at the time we filed our 2010 Form 10-K that the peak-to-trough home price decline on a national basis would range between 21% and 26%. These estimates are based on our home price index, which is calculated differently from the S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index and therefore results in different percentages for comparable declines. These estimates also contain significant inherent uncertainty in the current market environment regarding a variety of critical assumptions we make when formulating these estimates, including the effect of actions the federal government has taken and may take with respect to housing finance reform; the management of the Federal Reserve’s MBS holdings; and the impact of those actions on home prices, unemployment and the general economic and interest rate environment. Because of these uncertainties, the actual home price decline we experience may differ significantly from these estimates. We also expect significant regional variation in home price declines and stabilization.

Our 22% to 29% peak-to-trough home price decline estimate corresponds to an approximate 32% to 40% peak-to-trough decline using the S&P/Case-Shiller index method. Our estimates differ from the S&P/Case-Shiller index in two principal ways: (1) our estimates weight expectations by number of properties, whereas the S&P/Case-Shiller index weights expectations based on property value, causing home price declines on higher priced homes to have a greater effect on the overall result; and (2) our estimates attempt to exclude sales of foreclosed homes because we believe that differing maintenance practices and the forced nature of the sales make foreclosed home prices less representative of market values, whereas the S&P/Case-Shiller index includes foreclosed homes sales. The S&P/Case-Shiller comparison numbers are calculated using our models and assumptions, but modified to account for weighting based on property value and the impact of foreclosed property sales. In addition to these differences, our estimates are based on our own internally available data combined with publicly available data, and are therefore based on data collected nationwide, whereas the S&P/Case-Shiller index is based on publicly available data, which may be limited in certain geographic areas of the country. Our comparative calculations to the S&P/Case-Shiller index provided above are not modified to account for this data pool difference. We are working on enhancing our home price estimates to identify and exclude a greater portion of foreclosed home sales. When we begin reporting these enhanced home price estimates, we expect that some period to period comparisons of home prices may differ from those determined using our current estimates.

 

Credit-Related Expenses and Credit Losses.  We expect that our credit-related expenses and our credit losses will be higher in 2011 than in 2010. We describe our credit loss outlook above under “Providing Liquidity, Our Strong New Book of Business and Expected Losses on Single-Family Loans We Acquired before 2009—Expected Losses on Our Legacy Book of Business.”

 

Uncertainty Regarding our Long-Term Financial Sustainability and Future Status.  There is significant uncertainty in the current market environment, and any changes in the trends in macroeconomic factors that we currently anticipate, such as home prices and unemployment, may cause our future credit-related expenses and credit losses to vary significantly from our current expectations. Although Treasury’s funds under the senior preferred stock purchase agreement permit us to remain solvent and avoid receivership, the resulting dividend payments are substantial. We do not expect to earn profits in excess of our annual dividend obligation to Treasury for the indefinite future. As a result of these factors, there is significant uncertainty about our long-term financial sustainability.

 

In addition, there is significant uncertainty regarding the future of our company, including how long we will continue to be in existence, the extent of our role in the market, what form we will have, and what ownership interest, if any, our current common and preferred stockholders will hold in us after the conservatorship is terminated. We expect this uncertainty to continue. On February 11, 2011 Treasury and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) released a report to Congress on reforming America’s housing finance market. The report states that the Administration will work with FHFA to determine the best way to responsibly wind down both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The report emphasizes the importance of providing the necessary financial support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the transition period. We cannot predict the prospects for the enactment, timing or content of legislative proposals regarding long-term reform of the GSEs. Please see “Legislation and GSE Reform” in this report and in our 2010 Form 10-K for a discussion of recent legislative reform of the financial services industry, and proposals for GSE reform, that could affect our business and “Risk Factors” for a discussion of the risks to our business relating to the uncertain future of our company.

 

GSE Reform

 

As required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”), on February 11, 2011, Treasury and HUD released their report to Congress on ending the conservatorships of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and reforming the housing finance market. The report provides that the Administration will work with FHFA to determine the best way to responsibly reduce Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s role in the market and ultimately wind down both institutions.

The report identifies a number of policy steps that could be used to wind down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, reduce the government’s role in housing finance and help bring private capital back to the mortgage market. These steps include (1) increasing guaranty fees, (2) gradually increasing the level of required down payments so that any mortgages insured by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac eventually have at least a 10% down payment, (3) reducing conforming loan limits to those established in the Federal Housing Finance Regulatory Reform Act of 2008 (the “2008 Reform Act”), (4) encouraging Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to pursue additional credit loss protection and (5) reducing Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s portfolios, consistent with Treasury’s senior preferred stock purchase agreements with the companies.

 

In addition, the report outlines three potential options for a new long-term structure for the housing finance system following the wind-down of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The first option would privatize housing finance almost entirely. The second option would add a government guaranty mechanism that could scale up during times of crisis. The third option would involve the government offering catastrophic reinsurance behind private mortgage guarantors. Each of these options assumes the continued presence of programs operated by FHA, the Department of Agriculture and the Veterans Administration to assist targeted groups of borrowers. The report does not state whether or how the existing infrastructure or human capital of Fannie Mae may be used in the establishment of such a reformed system. The report emphasizes the importance of proceeding with a careful transition plan and providing the necessary financial support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac during the transition period. A copy of the report can be found on the Housing Finance Reform section of Treasury’s Web site, www.Treasury.gov. We are providing Treasury’s Web site address solely for your information, and information appearing on Treasury’s Web site is not incorporated into this quarterly report on Form 10-Q.

 

We expect that Congress will continue to hold hearings and consider legislation in 2011 on the future status of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In both the House of Representatives and the Senate, legislation has been introduced that would require FHFA to make a determination within two years of enactment whether the GSEs were financially viable and, if the GSEs were determined to be not financially viable, to place them into receivership. As drafted, these bills may upon enactment impair our ability to issue securities in the capital markets and therefore our ability to conduct our business, absent the federal government providing an explicit guarantee of their existing and ongoing liabilities.

 

In the House of Representatives, the Subcommittee on Capital Markets and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the Financial Services Committee has also approved several specific bills relating to GSE operations, including the following: (1) suspending current compensation packages and applying a government pay scale for GSE employees; (2) requiring the GSEs to increase guarantee fees; (3) subjecting GSE loans to the risk retention standards in the Dodd-Frank Act; (4) requiring a quicker reduction of GSE portfolios than required under the senior preferred stock purchase agreement; (5) requiring Treasury to pre-approve all GSE debt issuances; (6) repealing the GSEs’ affordable housing goals; and (7) prohibiting FHFA from approving any new GSE products during conservatorship or receivership, with certain exceptions.

 

We expect additional legislation relating to the GSEs to be introduced and considered by Congress in 2011. We cannot predict the prospects for the enactment, timing or content of legislative proposals regarding the future status of the GSEs.

 

In sum, there continues to be uncertainty regarding the future of our company, including how long we will continue to be in existence, the extent of our role in the market, what form we will have, and what ownership interest, if any, our current common and preferred stockholders will hold in us after the conservatorship is terminated. Please see “Risk Factors” for a discussion of the risks to our business relating to the uncertain future of our company.

 

Proposed Rules Implementing the Dodd-Frank Act

 

Below we describe some rules that have been proposed by various government agencies to implement provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act. We are currently evaluating these proposed rules and how they may impact our business and the housing finance industry.

Risk Retention.  On March 29, 2011, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, FHFA and HUD issued a joint proposed rule implementing the risk retention requirements established by the Dodd-Frank Act. Under the proposed rule, securitizers would be required to retain at least 5% of the credit risk with respect to the assets they securitize. The proposed rule offers several options for compliance by parties with assets to securitize, one of which is to have either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac securitize the assets. As long as Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac (1) fully guarantees the assets, thereby taking on 100% of their credit risk, and (2) is in conservatorship or receivership at the time the assets are securitized, no further retention of credit risk is required. Certain mortgage loans meeting the definition of a “Qualified Residential Mortgage” are exempt from the requirements of the rule. Only mortgage loans that are first lien mortgages on primary residences with loan-to-value ratios not exceeding 80% (75% for refinancings and 70% for cash-out refinancings) and that meet certain other underwriting requirements, would meet the definition of “Qualified Residential Mortgage” under the proposal.

 

Ability to Repay.  On April 19, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board issued a proposed rule pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act that, among others things, requires creditors to determine a borrower’s “ability to repay” a mortgage loan under Regulation Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act. If a creditor fails to comply, a borrower may be able to offset amounts owed as part of a foreclosure or recoup monetary damages. The proposed rule offers several options for complying with the ability to repay requirement, including making loans that meet certain terms and characteristics (so-called “qualified mortgages”), which may provide creditors with special protection from liability. As proposed, a loan is generally a qualified mortgage if, among other things, the borrower’s income and assets are verified, the loan term does not exceed 30 years, the loan is fully amortizing with no negative amortization, interest-only or balloon features, and the loan is underwritten at the maximum interest rate applicable in the first five years of the loan, taking into account all mortgage-related obligations.

 

Derivatives.  On April 12, 2011, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FHFA, the Farm Credit Administration and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency proposed rules under the Dodd-Frank Act governing margin and capital requirements applicable to entities that are subject to their oversight. On April 28, 2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission proposed rules under the Dodd-Frank Act governing margin requirements for swap dealers and major swap participants engaging in derivative trades that are not submitted for clearing to a derivatives clearing organization (“uncleared trades”). These proposed rules would require that, for all uncleared trades, we collect from our counterparties and provide to our counterparties collateral in excess of the amounts we have historically collected or provided, regardless of whether we are deemed to be a major swap participant.

 

The preparation of financial statements in accordance with GAAP requires management to make a number of judgments, estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amount of assets, liabilities, income and expenses in the condensed consolidated financial statements. Understanding our accounting policies and the extent to which we use management judgment and estimates in applying these policies is integral to understanding our financial statements. We describe our most significant accounting policies in “Note 1, Summary of Significant Accounting Policies” of this report and in our 2010 Form 10-K.

 

We evaluate our critical accounting estimates and judgments required by our policies on an ongoing basis and update them as necessary based on changing conditions. Management has discussed any significant changes in judgments and assumptions in applying our critical accounting policies with the Audit Committee of our Board of Directors. We have identified three of our accounting policies as critical because they involve significant judgments and assumptions about highly complex and inherently uncertain matters, and the use of

reasonably different estimates and assumptions could have a material impact on our reported results of operations or financial condition. These critical accounting policies and estimates are as follows:

 

 

See “MD&A—Critical Accounting Policies and Estimates” in our 2010 Form 10-K for a detailed discussion of these critical accounting policies and estimates. We provide below information about our Level 3 assets and liabilities as of March 31, 2011 as compared with December 31, 2010.

 

Fair Value Measurement

 

The use of fair value to measure our assets and liabilities is fundamental to our financial statements and is a critical accounting estimate because we account for and record a portion of our assets and liabilities at fair value. In determining fair value, we use various valuation techniques. We describe the valuation techniques and inputs used to determine the fair value of our assets and liabilities and disclose their carrying value and fair value in “Note 13, Fair Value.”

 

Fair Value Hierarchy—Level 3 Assets and Liabilities

 

The assets and liabilities that we have classified as Level 3 consist primarily of financial instruments for which there is limited market activity and therefore little or no price transparency. As a result, the valuation techniques that we use to estimate the fair value of Level 3 instruments involve significant unobservable inputs, which generally are more subjective and involve a high degree of management judgment and assumptions. Our Level 3 assets and liabilities consist of certain mortgage- and asset-backed securities and residual interests, certain mortgage loans, certain acquired property, certain long-term debt arrangements and certain highly structured, complex derivative instruments.

 

Table 5 presents a comparison, by balance sheet category, of the amount of financial assets carried in our condensed consolidated balance sheets at fair value on a recurring basis (“recurring asset”) that were classified as Level 3 as of March 31, 2011 and December 31, 2010. The availability of observable market inputs to measure fair value varies based on changes in market conditions, such as liquidity. As a result, we expect the amount of financial instruments carried at fair value on a recurring basis and classified as Level 3 to vary each period.

 

 

Assets measured at fair value on a nonrecurring basis and classified as Level 3, which are not presented in the table above, primarily include mortgage loans and acquired property. The fair value of Level 3 nonrecurring

assets totaled $42.7 billion during the quarter ended March 31, 2011 and $63.0 billion during the year ended December 31, 2010.

 

Financial liabilities measured at fair value on a recurring basis and classified as Level 3 consisted of long-term debt with a fair value of $1.1 billion as of March 31, 2011 and $1.0 billion as of December 31, 2010, and other liabilities with a fair value of $121 million as of March 31, 2011 and $143 million as of December 31, 2010.

 

In this section we discuss our condensed consolidated results of operations for the periods indicated. You should read this section together with our condensed consolidated financial statements, including the accompanying notes.

 

Table 6 summarizes our condensed consolidated results of operations for the periods indicated.

 

 

 

 

Net Interest Income

 

Table 7 presents an analysis of our net interest income, average balances, and related yields earned on assets and incurred on liabilities for the periods indicated. For most components of the average balances, we used a daily weighted average of amortized cost. When daily average balance information was not available, such as for mortgage loans, we used monthly averages. Table 8 presents the change in our net interest income between periods and the extent to which that variance is attributable to: (1) changes in the volume of our interest-earning assets and interest-bearing liabilities or (2) changes in the interest rates of these assets and liabilities. In the fourth quarter of 2010, we changed the presentation to distinguish the change in net interest income of Fannie Mae from the change in net interest income of consolidated trusts. We have revised the presentation of results for prior periods to conform to the current period presentation.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Net interest income increased in the first quarter of 2011, as compared with the first quarter of 2010, due to lower interest expense on debt, which was partially offset by lower interest income on loans and securities. The primary drivers of this change were:

 

 

For the first quarter of 2011, interest income that we did not recognize for nonaccrual mortgage loans, net of recoveries, was $1.6 billion, which resulted in a 20 basis point reduction in net interest yield, compared with $2.7 billion for the first quarter of 2010, which resulted in a 33 basis point reduction in net interest yield. Of

the $1.6 billion of interest income that we did not recognize for nonaccrual mortgage loans for the first quarter of 2011, $1.4 billion was related to the unsecuritized mortgage loans that we owned during the period. Of the $2.7 billion of interest income that we did not recognize for nonaccrual mortgage loans for the first quarter of 2010, $566 million was related to the unsecuritized mortgage loans that we own.

 

For a discussion of the interest income from the assets we have purchased and the interest expense from the debt we have issued, see the discussion of our Capital Markets group’s net interest income in “Business Segment Results.”

 

Fair Value Gains (Losses), Net

 

Table 9 presents the components of our fair value gains and losses.

 

 

Risk Management Derivatives Fair Value Gains (Losses), Net

 

We supplement our issuance of debt securities with derivative instruments to further reduce duration and prepayment risks. We recorded risk management derivative fair value gains in the first quarter of 2011 primarily as a result of an increase in the fair value of our pay-fixed derivatives due to an increase in swap interest rates during the first quarter of 2011, which was partially offset by fair value losses due to time decay on our purchased options.

 

We recorded risk management derivative losses in the first quarter of 2010 as a result of: (1) a decrease in implied interest rate volatility, which reduced the fair value of our purchased options; (2) a decrease in the fair value of our pay-fixed derivatives due to a decline in swap interest rates; and (3) time decay on our purchased options.

 

We present, by derivative instrument type, the fair value gains and losses on our derivatives for the three months ended March 31, 2011 and 2010 in “Note 9, Derivative Instruments.”

 

Mortgage Commitment Derivatives Fair Value Gains (Losses), Net

 

Commitments to purchase or sell some mortgage-related securities and to purchase single-family mortgage loans are generally accounted for as derivatives. For open mortgage commitment derivatives, we include

changes in their fair value in our condensed consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive loss. When derivative purchase commitments settle, we include the fair value of the commitment on the settlement date in the cost basis of the loan or security we purchase. When derivative commitments to sell securities settle, we include the fair value of the commitment on the settlement date in the cost basis of the security we sell. Purchases of securities issued by our consolidated MBS trusts are treated as extinguishments of debt; we recognize the fair value of the commitment on the settlement date as a component of debt extinguishment gains and losses. Sales of securities issued by our consolidated MBS trusts are treated as issuances of consolidated debt; we recognize the fair value of the commitment on the settlement date as a component of debt in the cost basis of the debt issued.

 

We recognized gains on our mortgage commitments in the first quarter of 2011 primarily due to gains on commitments to sell mortgage-related securities as a result of a decrease in prices as interest rates increased during the commitment period.

 

We recognized losses on our mortgage commitments in the first quarter of 2010 primarily due to losses on commitments to sell mortgage-related securities as a result of an increase in prices as interest rates decreased during the commitment period.

 

Trading Securities Gains (Losses), Net

 

The gains from our trading securities in the first quarter of 2011 and 2010 were primarily driven by the narrowing of credit spreads on commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”); gains in the first quarter of 2010 were also driven by a decrease in interest rates.

 

Credit-Related Expenses

 

We refer to our provision for loan losses and the provision for guaranty losses collectively as our “provision for credit losses.” Credit-related expenses consist of our provision for credit losses and foreclosed property expense.

 

Provision for Credit Losses

 

Our total loss reserves provide for an estimate of credit losses incurred in our guaranty book of business as of each balance sheet date. We establish our loss reserves through the provision for credit losses for losses that we believe have been incurred and will eventually be reflected over time in our charge-offs. When we determine that a loan is uncollectible, typically upon foreclosure, we record a charge-off against our loss reserves. We record recoveries of previously charged-off amounts as a reduction to charge-offs, which results in an increase to our loss reserves.

 

Table 10 displays the components of our total loss reserves and our total fair value losses previously recognized on loans purchased out of MBS trusts reflected in our condensed consolidated balance sheets. Because these fair value losses lowered our recorded loan balances, we have fewer inherent losses in our guaranty book of business and consequently require lower total loss reserves. For these reasons, we consider these fair value losses as an “effective reserve,” apart from our total loss reserves, to the extent that we expect to realize credit losses on the acquired loans in the future. We estimate that approximately two-thirds of this amount, as of March 31, 2011, represents credit losses we expect to realize in the future and approximately one-third will eventually be recovered through our condensed consolidated statements of operations and comprehensive loss, primarily as net interest income if the loan cures or as foreclosed property income if the sale of the collateral exceeds the recorded investment in the credit-impaired loan. How much of these fair value losses we expect to realize as credit losses depends primarily on home prices and loss severity. We exclude these fair value losses from our credit loss calculation as described in “Credit Loss Performance Metrics.”

 

 

 

 

We refer to our allowance for loan losses and reserve for guaranty losses collectively as our combined loss reserves. We summarize the changes in our combined loss reserves in Table 11.

 

 

 

 

The continued stress on a broad segment of borrowers from continued high levels of unemployment and underemployment and the prolonged decline in home prices have caused our total loss reserves to remain high for the past several quarters. Our total loss reserves increased in the first quarter of 2011 due to: (1) a decline in home prices and increase in initial charge-off severity during the period, (2) the number of loans that entered a trial modification period during the quarter, (3) a decline in future expected home prices and (4) loans continuing to remain delinquent for an extended period of time. Our provision for credit losses decreased in the first quarter of 2011 compared with the first quarter of 2010, primarily because our total loss reserves increased less in the first quarter of 2011 than in the first quarter of 2010.

 

Because of the substantial volume of loan modifications we completed and the number of loans that entered a trial modification period in 2010 and the first quarter of 2011, more than half of our total loss reserves is attributable to individual impairment rather than the collective reserve for loan losses. Individual impairment for a troubled debt restructuring (“TDR”) is based on the restructured loan’s expected cash flows over the life of the loan, taking into account the effect of any concessions granted to the borrower, discounted at the loan’s original effective interest rate. The model includes forward-looking assumptions using multiple scenarios of the future economic environment, including interest rates and home prices. Based on the structure of the modifications, in particular the size of the concession granted, and the performance of modified loans combined with the forward-looking assumptions used in our model, the allowance calculated for an individually impaired loan has generally been greater than the allowance that would be calculated under the collective reserve. Further, if we expect to recover our recorded investment in an individually impaired loan through probable foreclosure of the underlying collateral, we measure the impairment based on the fair value of the collateral. The loss reserve for a greater portion of our population of individually impaired loans was based on the fair value of the underlying collateral as of March 31, 2011 than as of March 31, 2010.

 

Additionally, while delinquency rates on loans in our single-family guaranty book of business have decreased, borrowers’ inability or unwillingness to make their mortgage payments, along with delays in foreclosures, continue to cause loans to remain seriously delinquent for an extended period of time as shown in “Table 35: Delinquency Status of Single-Family Conventional Loans.”

 

For additional discussion of our loan workout activities, delinquent loans and concentrations, see “Risk Management—Credit Risk Management—Single-Family Mortgage Credit Risk Management—Problem Loan Management.” For a discussion of our charge-offs, see “Credit Loss Performance Metrics.”

 

Our balance of nonperforming single-family loans remained high as of March 31, 2011 due to both high levels of delinquencies and an increase in TDRs. When a TDR is executed, the loan status becomes current, but the loan will continue to be classified as a nonperforming loan as the loan is not performing in accordance with the original terms. The composition of our nonperforming loans is shown in Table 12. For information on the impact of TDRs and other individually impaired loans on our allowance for loan losses, see “Note 3, Mortgage Loans.”

 

 

 

 

 

Foreclosed Property Expense (Income)

 

The shift to foreclosed property expense during the first quarter of 2011 from foreclosed property income during the first quarter of 2010 was primarily due to higher REO inventory as of March 31, 2011 compared with March 31, 2010 and an increase in valuation adjustments that reduced the value of our REO inventory. The foreclosed property income in the first quarter of 2010 was primarily due to the recognition of $562 million in fees from the cancellation and restructuring of some of our mortgage insurance coverage; there were no such fees recognized in the first quarter of 2011. These fees represented an acceleration of, and discount on, claims to be paid pursuant to the coverage in order to reduce our future exposure to our mortgage insurers.

 

Credit Loss Performance Metrics

 

Our credit-related expenses should be considered in conjunction with our credit loss performance. Our credit loss performance metrics, however, are not defined terms within GAAP and may not be calculated in the same manner as similarly titled measures reported by other companies. Because management does not view changes in the fair value of our mortgage loans as credit losses, we adjust our credit loss performance metrics for the impact associated with the acquisition of credit-impaired loans. We also exclude interest forgone on nonperforming loans in our mortgage portfolio, other-than-temporary impairment losses resulting from

deterioration in the credit quality of our mortgage-related securities and accretion of interest income on acquired credit-impaired loans from credit losses.

 

Historically, management viewed our credit loss performance metrics, which include our historical credit losses and our credit loss ratio, as indicators of the effectiveness of our credit risk management strategies. As our credit losses are now at such high levels, management has shifted focus to our loss mitigation strategies and the reduction of our total credit losses and away from the credit loss ratio to measure performance. However, we believe that credit loss performance metrics may be useful to investors as the losses are presented as a percentage of our book of business and have historically been used by analysts, investors and other companies within the financial services industry. They also provide a consistent treatment of credit losses for on- and off-balance sheet loans. Moreover, by presenting credit losses with and without the effect of fair value losses associated with the acquisition of credit-impaired loans, investors are able to evaluate our credit performance on a more consistent basis among periods. Table 13 details the components of our credit loss performance metrics as well as our average single-family and multifamily default rate and initial charge-off severity rate.