

HEWLETT PACKARD CO

Form DFAN14A

January 24, 2002

**SCHEDULE 14A**  
**(RULE 14a-101)**  
**INFORMATION REQUIRED IN PROXY STATEMENT**  
**SCHEDULE 14A INFORMATION**  
**PROXY STATEMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 14(a) OF THE**  
**SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934**

Filed by the Registrant ☐

Filed by a Party other than the Registrant ☒

Check the appropriate box:

☐ Preliminary Proxy Statement

☐ Definitive

Proxy

Statement ☐

Confidential, for

Use of the

Commission Only

(as permitted by

Rule 14a-6(e)(2)) ☐

Definitive

Additional

Materials ☒

Soliciting

Material Pursuant

to Rule 14a-12

**HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY**

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(Name of Registrant as Specified In Its Charter)

**WALTER B. HEWLETT, EDWIN E. VAN BRONKHORST AND THE WILLIAM R. HEWLETT REVOCABLE TRUST**

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(Name of Person(s) Filing Proxy Statement, if other than the Registrant)

Payment of Filing Fee (Check the appropriate box):

☒ Fee not required.

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computed on

table below per

Exchange Act

Rules 14a-6(i)(4)

and 0-11.

(1) Title of each

class of securities

to which

transaction

applies:

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(2) Aggregate number of securities to which transaction applies:

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(3) Per unit price or other underlying value of transaction computed pursuant to Exchange Act Rule 0-11 (Set forth the amount on which the filing fee is calculated and state how it was determined):

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(4) Proposed maximum aggregate value of transaction:

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(5) Total fee paid:

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☐ Check box if any part of the fee is offset as provided by Exchange Act Rule 0-11(a)(2) and identify the filing for which the offsetting fee was paid previously. Identify the previous filing by registration statement number, or the form or schedule and the date of its filing.

(1) Amount

Previously Paid:

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(2) Form,  
Schedule or  
Registration  
Statement No.:

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(3) Filing Party:

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(4) Date Filed:

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<sup>1</sup> HP 425, 9/25/01, Ms. Fiorina's speech to the European IDC Forum, p. 2

<sup>2</sup> Amendment  
No. 2 to HP  
form S-4,  
1/14/02, p. 50;  
HP Letter to  
Shareholders,  
1/18/02;  
Financial  
Times  
1/19/02;  
TheDeal.com,  
1/21/02

page 7

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<sup>1</sup> Goldman Sachs comparable company index is comprised of companies used by Goldman in performing its Selected Companies Analysis in connection with rendering its fairness opinion to HP relating to HP's proposed merger with Compaq and includes AAPL, ACN, CSC, DELL, EDS, EMC, GTW, IBM, KCIN, NTAP, and SUNW. Index is weighted by shares outstanding.

<sup>1</sup> HP 425 Filing, 12/19/01, p. 30

<sup>2</sup> Represents the value of the core dilution of the transaction before the realization of cost savings at HP's current 2002 calendar year price-earnings multiple of 23.7x. Calendar 2002 pro forma earnings before cost savings calculated based on First Call consensus earnings estimates of \$0.89 and \$1.27 for HP for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, respectively, and \$0.25 for Compaq for its fiscal 2002. Under management's present value methodology, the core dilution has a value of \$3.36 per share based on calendar 2004 earnings estimates.<sup>3</sup> [HP's pro forma] financial statements do not include any adjustments for liabilities resulting from integration planning, as

management of HP and Compaq are in the process of making these assessments, and estimates of these costs are not currently known. However, liabilities ultimately will be recorded for severance or relocation costs related to Compaq employees, costs of vacating some facilities (leased or owned) of Compaq, or other costs associated with exiting activities of Compaq that would affect amounts in the pro forma financial statements. In addition, HP may incur significant restructuring charges upon completion of the merger or in subsequent quarters for severance or relocation costs related to HP employees, costs of vacating some facilities (leased or owned) of HP, and other costs associated with exiting activities of HP.

Amendment No. 2 to HP S-4 Filing,







<sup>1</sup> For complete detail on sources, see page 49 of the Report to the Trustees of the William R. Hewlett Revocable Trust on the Proposed Merger of Hewlett-Packard filed with the SEC under cover of Schedule 14A on 11/16/2001

<sup>2</sup> Analysts  
estimates  
exclude  
Salomon Smith  
Barney as they  
are advisers to  
Compaq<sup>3</sup> Parties  
to Walter  
Hewlett proxy  
solicitation<sup>4</sup> HP  
Position on  
Compaq  
Merger,  
12/19/01, p.  
27<sup>5</sup> Represents  
Post-deal 1999  
performance  
vs. analyst  
estimates. For  
complete detail  
see p. 50 of  
reference in  
footnote  
No. 1<sup>6</sup> Computer  
Company  
results outlined  
in McKinsey  
Quarterly,  
Why Mergers  
Fail, 2001  
Number 4.  
(Name of  
actual  
company  
disguised in  
article). In  
early 2001, HP  
retained  
McKinsey &  
Co. to assist in  
HP's evaluation  
of strategic  
alternatives  
and potential  
acquisition  
candidates  
including  
Compaq<sup>7</sup> Sun  
10Q, 10K, Sun  
1/18/02  
earnings press  
release.  
Represents  
12 month

period ending  
12/31, (FY  
ends 6/30)<sup>8</sup> HP  
11/14/01  
earnings press  
release.  
Represents  
12 month  
period ending  
10/31  
(excluding  
restructuring  
and  
merger-related  
costs)<sup>9</sup> Apple  
FY2001 10K.  
Represents  
12 month  
period ending  
9/29<sup>10</sup> Compaq  
earnings press  
release  
1/16/02.  
Represents  
12 month  
period ending  
12/31  
(excluding  
restructuring  
and  
merger-related  
costs)<sup>11</sup> Morgan  
Stanley,  
Gateway:  
Better Margin  
Structure,  
Lower Rev  
Run Rate,  
1/8/02, page  
3<sup>12</sup> FFL/Parthenon  
assumption  
based on  
historical  
experience of  
tech  
companies,  
revenue loss in  
services, and  
high fixed cost  
assumptions  
post planned  
cost  
synergies<sup>13</sup> Amendment  
No. 2 to HP  
S-4, 1/14/02, p.  
53 ...weighted  
average  
contribution  
margin of  
12%...



<sup>1</sup> McKinsey Quarterly, "Why Mergers Fail," 2001, Number 4. In early 2001, HP retained McKinsey & Co. to assist in HP's evaluation of strategic alternatives and potential acquisition candidates including Compaq

<sup>1</sup> Based on First Call estimates as of August 31, 2001

<sup>2</sup> Based on  
First Call  
estimates as  
of  
January 18,  
2002<sup>3</sup> See  
page 15 of  
this  
presentation

page 14

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<sup>1</sup> An index of comparable companies missed earnings by 2% and 46% in 2000 and 2001 respectively. This index is comprised of companies used by Goldman in performing its Selected Companies Analysis in connection with rendering its fairness opinion to HP relating to HP's proposed merger with Compaq and includes AAPL, CSC, DELL, EDS, EMC, GTW, IBM, NTAP, SUNW, excludes ACN and KCIN as they were not publicly traded on January 1, 2001. Index is weighted by shares outstanding. Numbers are calendarized for each quarter, especially relevant for companies with odd fiscal years (HP, DELL).

<sup>1</sup> Based on assumptions similar to management's outlined on page 30 of HP's Position on Compaq Merger, 12/19/01. Present values, except for core dilution and cost to achieve savings, calculated as of January 21, 2002 based on a 20x forward price-earnings multiple applied to net earnings impact in calendar year 2004. Assumes 26% marginal tax rate

<sup>2</sup> Assumes net pre-tax cost savings in calendar year 2004 of \$2.0 billion based on \$2.5 billion in cost savings and \$0.5 billion in lost profit on lost revenues. Lost profit calculation assumes \$84.0 billion in revenue in calendar year 2004 before revenue losses, 4.9% revenue loss, 12% contribution margin.<sup>3</sup> Represents the value of the core dilution of the transaction before the realization of cost savings at HP's current 2002 calendar year price-earnings multiple of 23.7x. Calendar 2002 pro forma earnings before cost savings calculated based on First Call consensus earnings estimates of \$0.89 and \$1.27 for HP for fiscal years 2002 and 2003, respectively, and \$0.25 for Compaq for its fiscal 2002. Under management's present value methodology, the core dilution has a value of \$3.36



per share based  
on calendar 2004  
earnings  
estimates.<sup>4</sup> Realistic  
case based on  
\$1.3 billion  
restructuring  
charge established  
in connection  
with Compaq's  
acquisition of  
DEC in 1998,  
which also  
involved  
approximately  
15,000 layoffs,  
and the  
\$635 million in  
retention bonuses  
announced by  
management in  
the proposed  
HP/Compaq  
merger.  
Downside case  
based on 50%  
premium to  
realistic case  
(11.4% of  
transaction  
value).  
Compaq/DEC  
restructuring  
charge as a  
percentage of  
transaction value  
was 13.5%.  
Excludes the  
impact of new  
employment  
agreements with  
Ms. Fiora and  
Mr. Capellas.  
Assumes cash is  
paid out ratably  
over the first six  
months following  
closing.<sup>5</sup> Realistic  
case based on  
BoFA,  
Hewlett-Packard:  
Management  
Turns up the  
Heat, 12/19/01  
base case of  
87.8% of  
management  
estimate realized  
in 2003  
(\$1.8 billion  
assumed vs.  
management

estimates of  
\$2.1 billion).  
Downside based  
on BofA  
downside case  
75.6% of  
management  
estimate realized  
in 2003 (\$1.6  
billion assumed  
vs. management  
estimates of  
\$2.1 billion).<sup>6</sup> Realistic  
case based on  
historical  
experience of tech  
companies,  
revenue loss in  
services, and  
higher fixed cost  
assumptions post  
planned cost  
synergies. See  
analysis presented  
on p. 21-26.  
Downside case  
based on discount  
to Compaq/DEC  
transaction.<sup>7</sup> Realistic  
case assumption  
based on  
historical  
experience of tech  
companies,  
revenue loss in  
services.  
Downside case  
based on discount  
to McKinsey  
computer  
company example  
(see Revenue  
Loss Benchmarks  
on p. 12).



<sup>1</sup> See footnotes on page 16 for bases of assumptions



<sup>1</sup> HP Position on Compaq Merger, 12/19/01, p. 27

<sup>2</sup> In the Aftermath of the Compaq Deal, SG Cowen Perspectives, 10/10/01 only firm to provide a comprehensive segment breakout. CPQ Deal will Produce a Stronger Competitor...But, UBS Warburg, 10/29/01 states that The history of server combinations indicates that 35% or more erosion to the acquired customer base can be expected, which translates into a 19% loss of Enterprise revenues for the combined company.<sup>3</sup> For complete detail on sources, see page 49 of the Report to the Trustees of the William R. Hewlett Revocable Trust on the Proposed Merger of Hewlett-Packard filed with the SEC under Schedule 14A on 11/16/2001<sup>4</sup> Party to Walter Hewlett Proxy solicitation<sup>5</sup> Representing Compaq in Proposed HP/Compaq Merger<sup>6</sup> Reference note 3, p. 50



<sup>1</sup> HP 425 Filing, 12/19/01, p. 44

<sup>2</sup> UBS Warburg  
Alpha Customer  
Study,  
Hewlett-Packard:  
It's About  
Revenues,  
12/13/01

page 21

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<sup>1</sup> Sun 10Q, 10K, Sun 1/18/02 earnings press release. Represents 12 month period ending 12/31, (FY ends 6/30)

<sup>2</sup> HP 11/14/01

earnings press  
release.

Represents

12 month

period ending

10/31

(excluding

restructuring

and

merger-related

costs)<sup>3</sup> Apple

FY2001 10K.

Represents

12 month

period ending

9/29<sup>4</sup> Compaq

earnings press

release

1/16/02.

Represents

12 month

period ending

12/31

(excluding

restructuring

and

merger-related

costs)<sup>5</sup> Morgan

Stanley,

Gateway:

Better Margin

Structure,

Lower Rev

Run Rate,

1/8/02, p.

<sup>3</sup> FFL/Parthenon

assumption

based on

historical

experience of

tech

companies,

revenue loss in

services, and

higher fixed

cost

assumptions

post planned

cost

synergies<sup>7</sup> Amendment

No. 2 to HP

form S-4,

01/14/02, page

53 ...weighted

average  
contribution  
margin of  
12%...<sup>8</sup> Represents  
Post-deal 1999  
performance  
vs. analyst  
estimates. See  
p. 12

page 22

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<sup>1</sup> UBS Warburg, Hewlett-Packard: It's About Revenues, 12/13/01. Survey found that 90% of Compaq Alpha customers would consider another vendor if HP plans to migrate them. This is in contrast to HP's representation that revenue losses would come from lower margin products (HP 425 Filing, 12/19/01, p. 44)

<sup>2</sup> HP 425 Filing, 12/19/01, p. 45<sup>3</sup> SG Cowen, In the Aftermath of the Compaq Deal, 10/10/01, p. 6

page 23

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<sup>1</sup> HP 425 Filing, 12/19/01, p. 27, footnote (2)

<sup>2</sup> For  
sources, see  
page 12 of  
this  
presentation

page 24

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<sup>1</sup> HP 425 Filing, 12/19/01, p. 19.

<sup>2</sup> Profit  
Contribution  
= Operating  
Income +  
Fixed Costs;  
therefore,  
Profit  
Contribution  
Operating  
Income =  
Fixed Costs.  
Total fixed  
costs defined  
as fixed  
operating  
expenses  
plus fixed  
COGS<sup>3</sup> One  
time costs as  
step costs

page 25

<sup>1</sup> Based on weighted average operating margin of 6.1% on lost revenues and weighted average gross margin of 20.7% on lost revenues. Operating margin calculated from Management's segment operating margin statements on p. 19 of HP 425 filing, 12/19/01. Revenue loss estimates by segment from SG Cowen, 10/10/01, "Hewlett Packard, In the Aftermath of the Compaq Deal," p. 9, and UBS Warburg, 10/29/01, "CPQ Deal Will Produce a Stronger Competitor But....," p. 1, as described on page 20 of this presentation. Gross margin calculated from Management's statement of 11% for Access (p. 27, p. 45, in 425 filing, 12/19/01) and uses SG Cowen's FY03 gross margin of 35.6% for IT Infrastructure and 28% for Services, as they are the only firm to provide a segment breakout for FY03. Though management has not specified the gross margins for these segments, we assume that SG Cowen has been guided by management to arrive at reasonable Enterprise and Services gross margin estimates. These gross margins by segment are weighted to arrive at weighted average gross margin for lost revenues using the methodology described above.

<sup>2</sup> HP 425 Filing, 12/19/01, p. 27, footnote (2).<sup>3</sup> Weighted average fixed costs as a percentage of COGS for lost sales in Access, Enterprise and Services. We assume Access has the lowest fixed costs as a percentage of COGS; Enterprise has several percentage points more fixed costs as a percentage of COGS than Access; Services has substantially higher fixed costs as a percentage of COGS since the majority of Services costs are in salaries of professionals, which are more fixed than manufacturing costs



<sup>1</sup> One time costs as step costs

page 28

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